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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been much debate as to whether partisanship matters on the local level 
in the United States. This thesis specifically seeks to test whether partisanship plays a 
role in an individuals’ selection of their ideal communities. Using data from the Kinder 
Houston Area Survey from 1982-2013, this thesis tests the effect of partisan differences 
in willingness to pay for: maintaining current levels of local services, public schools, and 
access to healthcare. As well as, partisan differences in selecting policy areas of concern 
for the City of Houston, and partisan differences in feelings towards ethnic diversity. I 
examine whether residents are choosing their ideal communities based on a sense of self-
interest or whether this determination is shaped by their partisanship.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
We are constantly inundated with terms and labels such as: Republican and 
Democrat, Red and Blue States, Conservative and Liberal in American politics. In the 
United States, politics often centers around partisanship on every level except, arguably, 
most local levels of government; where people actually live and work. Given that most 
local elections in the United States are non-partisan there is little literature on the 
importance of local partisanship (Krebs and Winburn, 2011). This thesis focuses on the 
role of partisanship in influencing individual views towards local policy preferences, and 
their definition of an ideal community.  
Recent academic and popular works examining ‘the partisan sort’ (Levendusky, 
2009; Bishop, 2008), argue politics is an important factor for where people live. Now 
more than ever partisanship in America matters. Party and ideology are more consistent 
than ever before and it is plausible to identify an individual’s partisan lean based on 
learning a few simple facts, such as: their place of residence, gender, race, age, etc. 
Building from this perspective, this thesis examines if the idea of the partisan sort 
influences views towards local services.  
 This new perspective of the ‘partisan sort’ runs against the traditional view of 
self-interest as being the crucial factor in an individual’s assessment of local services. 
Charles Tiebout’s 1956 seminal work “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, described 
that an individual’s criteria for selecting their ideal community depends on the numerous
2 
and unique combinations each has to offer in term of services, levels of quality, and tax 
policies (Tiebout, 1956). Tiebout’s perspective suggests the reasons that underlie an 
individual’s selection of their ideal community come predominantly from a place of self-
interest.  
In order to test each of these possible explanations, I examine the influences of 
residents’ partisanship and self-interest against a variety of different local conditions. The 
models in the following chapters use willingness to pay for local goods and services and 
the presence of other local conditions as a measurement for selecting ‘ideal’ 
communities. In general, it is assumed that Republicans will reject any non-vital tax 
increase, whereas Democrats are generally more open to the idea of tax increases to 
improve local goods, services, and conditions. This conventional wisdom is based on the 
political philosophies presented by both parties’ platforms and elites. Given this logic an 
individual might find it more in their self-interest to live in a community that most 
closely reflects their personal political preferences.  
Taxes are the backbone of any community and the levels at which they are 
assessed have everything to do with the quality of public services they are able to provide 
such as: encouraging economic development, public schools, road and traffic 
improvement, city worker pensions, and access to healthcare. The partisan make-up of a 
community directly determines the partisans that are voting, the partisans who in turn are 
elected to office, and the partisans, who when elected, govern with their economic 
spending philosophies. The literature discussed in Chapter 2 establishes the traditional 
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view of willingness to pay for local services from a self-interest perspective along with 
the more recent view that political views may also influence residents’ views.  If I find 
that partisanship shapes how individuals prioritize local goods and services, it would 
have important implications for why some communities fund certain goods and services 
more readily than others. This would also provide a contribution to the literature on how 
and why communities in the United States continue to fragment and polarize politically, 
as the partisan make-up of the individuals that reside in a community may contribute to 
the social and economic context that forces communities to prioritize their local goods 
and services.  
Chapter 2 examines the literature related to public choice and opinion with 
regards to the criteria by which individual citizens define their ideal communities. 
Chapter 3 lays out the specific hypotheses tested along with a theoretical foundation for 
the hypotheses.  In chapter 4, I discuss in detail the survey and methods used for the 
analysis while the final chapters present the analysis and a discussion of the results.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The majority of scholarship on local policy processes focuses on the variability of 
government responsiveness. All of these studies have underlying concerns about 
normative democratic theory, in particular to understand to what degree governments 
adopt policies that are concurrent with the preferences of their citizens. Similar to larger 
levels of government, localities/ municipalities also face the typical difficulties of 
governing such as: maintaining current levels of local services, encouraging economic 
development, providing quality public schools, funding road and traffic improvement 
programs, paying city worker pensions, and providing healthcare to their citizens. 
Communities face citizens who request these goods and services be provided at pleasing 
levels, while at the same time often lacking the level of desire to take on the higher tax 
burdens that enable communities to make those goods and services available. This is a 
high stakes balancing game for communities that wish to be attractive to live in from a 
goods and services standpoint, as well as from their tax policies. Peterson states that, 
“[E]specially in terms of urban politics, the social and economic context within the city is 
embedded limits choice” (Peterson, 1981, p. 8). Cities must find a way to fund the goods 
and services that they provide, but because cities run on budgets, the goods and services 
they provide are prioritized based on both their vital importance and citizen desires for 
those services. 
Communities run the risk of either not providing a package of services that 
citizens will desire for their ‘ideal communities’ or deterring them with tax levels at 
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which the average citizen would balk, and with little room for error in between. 
Americans now more than ever before are able to choose where they want to live and 
what lifestyle is ideal for them. Demographic shifts have reached their height of historical 
feasibility. In our current society the historical bonds of class have been broken down 
with the globalization of the economy, ethnic divisions largely ending with 
desegregation, occupations are less limited by location, and with planes, trains, and 
automobiles even geographical barriers are minimal (Bishop, 2008). Residents have the 
option to “vote with their feet” moving to municipalities that offer their ‘ideal’ local 
goods and services packages (Weisbrod, 1977, p. 33). The question is given these 
breakdowns in the traditional reasons for geographical sorting what other characteristics 
of their ideal community are people considering? According to Chris Riley a contributor 
to The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America is Tearing Us Apart, “There 
is no [demographic] category for somebody who shapes his entire life around his concern 
for the environment” (Bishop, 2008, p. 14). What this is describing however is one’s 
selection of their ‘ideal’ community based on individual interests and politics. 
“Americans are increasingly living in communities and neighborhoods whose residents 
share their values and they are increasingly voting for candidates who reflect those 
values” (Abramowitz, Alexander and Gunning, 2006, p. 88).  
Communities have become about where people’s economic preferences, 
lifestyles, and politics merge. In the early writings of the federalists and antifederalists 
they debated the political philosophy that would best guide this country into the future. 
The idea of partisan sorting is what federalist authors such as Madison and Hamilton 
feared. The federalist’s position was that a nation large enough and socioeconomically 
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diverse enough to foster a political environment where no group could gain a majority 
would be the beacon of a successful democracy (Sheehan, 2004, p. 411). With new and 
conflicting ideas being discussed regularly among its residents and government 
representatives this type of culture would abet extremism (Sunstein, 2003, p. 161). The 
antifederalists, however, held the opposing view. Brutus, the pseudonym for a prominent 
antifederalist writer wrote,  
“In a republic, the manners, sentiments, and interests, of the people should 
be similar. If this is not the case, there will be constant clashing of 
opinions; and the representatives of one part will continually strive against 
those of the other” (Sunstein, 2003, p. 146). 
An ideal federalist environment that would foster political discomfort and force 
democratic ideals, seems to have fallen to the wayside in the interest of partisan self-
sorting to assure us of like-minded neighbors and communities.  
This is the crossroads at which the popular literature concerning the political 
polarization of citizens in the United States into partisan communities meets the public 
choice literature on why communities fracture as a consequence of winning or losing the 
high stakes balancing game of idyllic goods and services and/or idyllic tax policies. 
Communities must always compete to effectively provide desirable goods and services, 
and prioritize the payment for those goods and services based on what they consider to be 
important in maintaining old and attracting new residents (Tiebout, 1956). This thesis is a 
departure from the previous literature on community fragmentation and the role of 
politics on local fiscal policies, which has been mainly concerned with the political elites 
and institutional characteristics (i.e. the gerrymandering of districts) of a community 
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without the interaction of partisanship or ideology (Peterson, 1981; Murphy and Smith, 
2016). Another extensively written about reason for community fragmentation has been 
the popularized notion of “white flight”. Bill Bishop explains that white flight may not be 
so much a racial segregation movement as a political one. According to data he used in 
his book, The Big Sort, from Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections and the 
U.S. Census of Population,  
“In 2000, 30 percent of America’s white population lived in counties that 
provided Republican landslide margins in the 2004 election. The real 
“white flight” of the past two generations has been whites moving to 
communities that were becoming staunchly Republican” (Bishop, 2008, p. 
53).  
Even in the literature that does consider partisanship as an interaction, it considers 
the partisanship of local political elites not the local citizens, with which I am concerned 
here (Gerber and Hopkins, 2011; Peterson, 1981; Murphy and Smith, 2016).  
Drawing on Anthony Downs, in his seminal work An Economic Theory of 
Democracy, I assume the perspective that individuals are rational, value maximizing, and 
are operating in a more or less competitive political marketplace (Downs, 1957; Peterson, 
1981). Applying these principals to local politics, my argument is based on the idea that 
residents are able to view their community situation, from a rational position to assess 
what they consider ideal or not, and within the limits of their information make decisions 
as to how to improve their situations (Downs, 1957; Peterson, 1981).  Even if improving 
their situation means relocating to different communities. According to Tiebout (1956) 
depending on the numerous and unique combinations of services, quality levels, and tax 
8 
 
 
prices that each locality provides, citizens decide whether or not to live in specific 
communities based on their consideration of their ‘ideal community’, including who 
would be there neighbors (Tiebout, 1956).  
However, it is important to note that Tiebout’s theory is only plausible if the 
policy issues are salient enough to push residents to establish preferences (Kellerher and 
Lowery, 2002). This thesis takes care to only test its partisan differences hypothesis 
across conditions that typically cue strong partisan interest. Tiebout’s theory of ideal 
community sorting cannot apply to all services provided by local government, but only to 
a smaller number of highly salient services (Kellerher and Lowery, 2002). 
The Big Sort, in one instance takes on the example of Portland, Oregon and the 
strong affinity among its residents for bicycling and public transport.  
“More than 10,000 bikes cross the four Willamette River bridges each 
workday… The word got out, and because Portland’s policy decision to 
promote bicycle riding and public transport as alternatives to automobiles, 
the city began attracting a certain type of citizen” (Mayer, 2005, Ai). 
This is Tiebout’s theory at work. It is describing a kind of citizen who values a 
particular type of public good, and at the same time also values the kind of people who 
value that same good. The economist John Cortright concludes that, “people who value 
transit are much more likely to move here [Portland] than, say, to Phoenix”, which has a 
strong suburban commuter culture (Bishop, 2008, p. 201). This is a clear example of how 
one type of public good can attract people to the set of local goods and services a locality 
can provide to make them feel: ‘at home’, ‘in tune with the political pulse’, ‘as having the 
same values and tastes’, as the community in which they choose to live. A good 
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description for this type of phenomenon is that the ‘location itself becomes a commodity’ 
(Bishop, 2008, p. 202).   
In Levendusky’s, The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and 
Conservatives Became Republicans, we find literature establishing the theory for why 
partisans sort over specific issue areas. Politics has generally well established partisan 
issues through the national party platforms and the elites of both parties (Levendusky, 
2009). Democrats have been labeled more liberal in their general policy spending 
philosophies than Republicans; this contention while well established at the national 
policy level has not been so well defined in local government policy preferences (Gerber 
and Hopkins, 2011). Several of the issues I test in this paper where I expect to find 
partisan differences are also tested by Levendusky, specifically government services and 
spending (Levendusky, 2009). Levendusky finds strong effects of partisan sorting across 
specific issue areas,  
“In 1972, 28 percent of the electorate was sorted, but that figure grows 
considerably over the next three decades to 46 percent in 2004… Clearly, 
respondents are lining up their party and ideological label today in much larger 
numbers than a generation ago. As the parties clarify their positions, ordinary 
Democrats and Republicans are moving their positions into alignment with their 
party elites” (Levendusky, 2009, p. 46). 
A number of public opinion authors would argue that political parties/ elites offer 
the mass public information short-cuts for developing their political issue positions 
(Converse, 1964; Jacoby, 1995; Levendusky, 2009; Zaller, 1992).    
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The argument of this thesis is that there is no ideal community that has a complete 
separation of Democrats and Republicans, and therefore we can test citizen’s willingness 
to pay for specific services and prioritize some local conditions for a partisan divide. In 
testing the public support for spending on selected local governmental service areas, it is 
also possible to identify the public policy priorities of citizens (Schumaker and Getter 
1977). Residents disagree over the prioritization and ideal levels of local goods and 
services, and “poor performance is more likely to be considered uniformly negative” 
(Hanjnal and Trounstine, 2014, p. 58). Residents present unique differences in perceived 
responsiveness, which reflects differences in perceived performance and therefore 
satisfaction (Hanjnal and Trounstine, 2014; Licari, McLean, and Rice 2005; Van Ryzin, 
Immerwahr, and Altman 2008; Van Ryzin 2007). Hanjnal and Trounstine consider these 
findings a sufficient enough basis for individual reports of satisfaction and service 
evaluation to be a reasonable measure of representation across different demographic and 
ideological groups (Hanjnal and Trounstine, 2014). 
In an article by Elisabeth Gerber and Daniel J. Hopkins, “When Mayors Matter: 
Estimating the Impact of Mayoral Partisanship on City Policy,” they find that the 
partisanship of the local mayor affects how the budget is spent along partisan lines 
(Gerber and Hopkins, 2011). Gerber and Hopkins find that mayors respond with their 
partisan spending preferences when faced with fiscal policy choices and distribution of 
monies to local services. They find that partisanship and spending philosophies are well 
connected on the local level. Further, they find Republicans spend more monies on police 
and fire protection; as they see it as a higher policy concern. Their findings are 
particularly important in discrediting a mainstream thought among urban politics scholars 
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that partisanship on the local level is not as meaningful as it is on the national level. 
Much of mainstream urban politics scholarship argues that we can think of urban politics 
as removed from partisanship, and that urban politics centers purely on local goods and 
services provision (Krebs and Winburn, 2011; Tiebout, 1956). In fact, many authors 
starting with Robert Dahl in his famous work, “Who Governs? Democracy and Power in 
the American City”, and others have described how political interests shape government 
outcomes at the local level (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Clark and Ferguson 
1983; Dahl 1961; Hanjnal and Trounstine 2005; Trounstine 2008). Leaving such factors 
such as the partisan make up of a locality out of an analysis on local communities is 
setting up an incomplete analysis.  
Residents are required to pay taxes to their community for the provision of local 
goods and services. However, this thesis is careful to consider citizens’ willingness to pay 
taxes under two possible explanations. The first is under the classical explanation that 
citizens see it as in their own self-interest to pay for the local goods and services that are 
performed for their specific benefit. The second explanation is the willingness to pay for 
specific taxes can be and is shaped by an individual’s political leanings. Local goods and 
services defy the common conception that residents will avoid paying taxes, to ‘free-ride, 
at all costs unless confronted with the fear of punishment’ (Fjeldstad, 2004; Finkel, 
Muller, and Opp, 1989; Alozie and McNamara 2010). Willingness to pay for local 
services is particularly interesting because of the day-to-day nature of local services 
residents are more motivated to pay for local services because of their personal use of 
those services. The importance residents place on paying for local services has been 
described as a feeling that there is  “a long list of “self-interested civic goals,” such as 
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“the sheer need to satisfy a sense of civic duty, help make the community a better place to 
live ‘doing their part,’ or a desire to influence public policy” (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995, p. 22-23; Alozie, McNamara 2010). This description illustrates citizens’ 
dual consideration of how local goods and services may individually affect them, but also 
how it will affect their communities.  
The traditional view of public opinion towards local services is the idea that self-
interest is a driving factor for people selecting their ideal community while the ‘partisan 
sort’ idea argues that political preferences are now part of that calculation. I argue that 
partisanship, because of its continued alignment with self-interest, can provide valuable 
insight into individuals’ perceptions of communities. While it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to directly test partisan sorting, what I am attempting to do is use the theory to 
highlight individual feelings towards local goods, services, and conditions. The idea of 
‘partisan sort’ over politically cued issues is providing the underlying theory for the 
hypotheses discussed in the next chapter.     
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III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
My theory rests on the idea that partisanship informs an individual’s prioritization 
of local goods and services and ultimately the selection of their ideal community. The 
crux of this theory lies in establishing that when an individual is choosing their ideal 
community their partisanship acts as an ideal indicator for what they consider to be most 
important. Local governments have only the ability to provide the local goods and 
services that their local tax structure prioritizes and allows. In accordance with their 
respective political party platform, I expect Republicans to be less willing to pay taxes for 
local goods and services than Democrats.  
The theory that partisanship plays a statistically significant role in an individual’s 
selection of their ideal community is tested against the traditional perspective of self-
interest while controlling for relevant individual characteristics. The older literature in 
this area argues the day-to-day nature of local goods and service provisions outweigh the 
importance of partisanship at the local level. My position is that partisanship acts as an 
ideal indicator; an information short cut for individuals seeking to answer questions like, 
‘[A]re these people as interested in quality public transport as much as I am or good 
public schools or is this community committed to keeping my taxes low’. A 
communities’ partisan majority is going to have an effect on the quality levels of the local 
goods and services that community is able to provide. This is most effectively explained 
by citizens’ willingness to pay taxes for those good and services.  
14 
 
 
From these assumptions, and concepts that have been developed in the public 
choice literature, I have developed a series of hypotheses. All of these hypotheses 
consider aspects of political life that are crucial to an individual in selecting their ideal 
community. 
The first hypothesis is that given a list among nine different categories as to what 
they consider to be the biggest problem facing the Houston area today Republicans and 
Democrats will consistently choose different biggest problem areas. Given that we 
assume Republicans and Democrats have different ideal community priorities, we should 
then assume they will select different biggest problems in the community depending on 
their different priority focuses.  
H1: Republicans and Democrats when asked, what's the biggest problem facing 
people in the Houston area today, will select different local policy areas. 
The second hypothesis moves more specifically into questions of partisan 
differences on taxation. Keeping in mind the general theoretical assumption of this thesis 
that Republicans will be less willing to pay taxes for any reason than Democrats, I apply 
this to willingness to pay taxes to improve the quality of public schools. To test the self-
interested goal of willingness to pay taxes to improve schools, I control for if the 
respondents have children. Public opinion research shows individuals with children care 
more deeply and pay more attention to politics surrounding public schools.1  
H2: Republicans will be less likely to be personally willing to pay higher school 
taxes than Democrats.  
                                                
1 See, Green, Philip Donald, and Jonathan A. Cowden. 1992. “Who Protests: Self-Interest and White 
Opposition to Busing”. The Journal of Politics 54(2):  471-496. 
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The third hypothesis deals with willingness to pay taxes to improve quality and 
access to healthcare, and keeps with the partisan difference expectation when dealing 
with questions of taxation. In order to control for the self-interested goal of willingness to 
pay taxes to improve quality and access to healthcare I control for if a respondent has 
health insurance. I assume that those that have a health insurance plan will be even less 
likely to want to pay taxes related to healthcare.  
H3: Republicans will be less likely to be willing to pay higher taxes to improve 
their quality and access to healthcare than Democrats.  
The fourth hypothesis probes a different type of ideal community quality, the 
demographics of place. The general assumption here is that Republicans will be much 
less open to the increasing ethnic diversity than Democrats. Here the control variable of 
ethnicity acts as the self-interest measure.  
H4: Republicans will be less likely to view growing ethnic diversity as a source of 
strength for the local government than Democrats.    
The fifth hypothesis returns to the partisan difference expectation when dealing 
with questions of taxation in the more general sense of asking about willingness to pay to 
maintain current levels of public services generally. Here the self-interest control variable 
that was best was an individuals’ rating of their local government, in this case Houston.   
H5: Republicans will be less likely to be personally willing to pay higher taxes to 
maintain current levels of public services than Democrats. 
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IV. DATA AND METHODS  
To test the above hypotheses, I use the Kinder Houston Area Survey (1982-2013).  
This ongoing project surveys individuals from the Houston, Texas area, primarily Harris 
County residents, where the center of the city is located. The data for this paper is 
archived with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Stephen 
L. Klineberg, Ph.D., a Professor of Sociology and Co-Director of the Kinder Institute for 
Urban Research at Rice University began the survey in 1982 and has continued 
consecutively over the last thirty-two years. Houston has a unique history. In May 1982, 
‘two months after the first Houston Area Survey was completed, the region’s oil boom 
collapsed’ (Kinder Houston Area Survey, 1982-2013).  The survey was continued 
through the mid-1980s and Houston’s recession recovery to its joining the global 
economy causing a transformation in its ethnic and cultural composition. A huge influx 
of immigrants has since moved into the city and changed into what is today, “the single 
most ethnically diverse large metropolitan region in the country” (Kinder Houston Area 
Survey, 1982-2013). In 2014 the City of Houston had a population of 2,239,558 making 
it the fourth largest city in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The Kinder 
Institute states that, “The overall purpose of this research is to measure systematically the 
public's responses to the new economic, educational, environmental and ethnic 
challenges… [And] to explore the bases for individual differences in attitudes and 
beliefs” (Kinder Houston Area Survey, 1982-2013).  
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In large majority the questions in the survey were not given every year, however 
when they were replicated it was done using identical wording and the question was 
placed in a similar location in the survey as it had been originally. The survey was given 
in counties considered as a part of the Houston Area, largely to Harris County residents. 
The respondents were selected by random-digit-dialing and given the survey via 
computer-assisted telephone interviews. The data was obtained from adults age eighteen 
or older, with preference given to adult males, living in homes with a landline or cell 
phone. The interviewers were bilingual capable. The sampling procedures and interviews 
were conducted each year during February and March by different research firms: 
Telesurveys Research Associates (1982-2004), the Survey Research Institute at the 
University of Houston (2005-2011), and Social Science Research Solutions (2012-
present). The unit of observation for the survey is the individual. The survey measures 
respondents’ attitudes on a number of different political and practical issues at the local, 
state, and national levels. The surveys also recorded individual respondents religious and 
political orientations, residence patterns, socioeconomic indicators, family structures, and 
other important demographic characteristics. 
The Kinder Houston Area Survey reports that in the early years, the sample sizes 
ranged from 412 to 550; since 1990, they have been set at around 650, and in 2010 and 
2011 at 750 (Kinder Houston Area Survey, 1982-2013). In 2012, the samples broadened 
to more than 1,300 respondents from all ten of the counties that define the greater 
Houston metropolitan region (i.e., not only Harris County, but also Fort Bend, 
Montgomery, Galveston, Brazoria, Liberty, Waller, Chambers, Austin, and San Jacinto 
counties) (Kinder Houston Area Survey, 1982-2013). The survey has made efforts to 
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ensure the equal distribution of respondents across ethnicity. The survey reports its 
response rates, defined as the number of completed interviews in relation to all 
potentially eligible phone numbers, as averaging around 75 percent during the 1980s; but 
after caller-ID response rates fall to around 35 percent (Kinder Houston Area Survey, 
1982-2013). The data files containing all thirty-two years of responses from these 
successive representative samples of Harris County residents have been edited and 
reformatted for clarity.  
 This data has been used by scholars in a variety of fields related to urban politics.  
In James Shelton and Nicole Coleman’s article “After the Storm: How Race, Class, and 
Immigration Concerns Influenced Beliefs About the Katrina Evacuees,” they study the 
September 2005 post Hurricane Katrina migration of over 150,000 Gulf Coast residents 
and their relocation to the City of Houston, and its effects on the socioeconomic and 
political culture of Houston. Using data from 2006 and 2008 to analyze attitudes towards 
Katrina evacuees they found that this population was viewed similarly to, “noncitizens 
seeking entrance into the United States” (Shelton and Nicole, 2009, p. 494). By taping 
local individual attitudes on a range of racial, ethnic, and immigration topics assessed in 
the survey the authors were able to find that the most negative attitudes were held 
towards members of the poor African American community (Shelton and Nicole, 2009).  
Another study by Mark Fossett and Warren Waren, “Overlooked Implications of 
Ethnic Preferences for Residential Segregation in Agent-based Models” is motivated to 
understand the effects of ethnic preferences and the effect such preferences can have on 
residential communities. Fossett and Waren seek to discredit previous literature that 
weak-to-moderate preferences for one’s residential ethnic mix will have little to no effect 
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on the realization of ethnic residential segregation. They find that the analysis of previous 
literature was incomplete because it did not consider the interaction between ethnic 
preferences and ethnic demography. Specifically, they find support for their hypothesis 
that, “preferences are segregation-promoting when demand for co-ethnic contact cannot 
be satisfied by demographic supply under integration” (Fossett and Waren, 2005, p. 
1916). Meaning that the survey helped them determine that ethnic preferences, even 
when “weak-to-moderate” allow for residential segregation to become prevalent when it 
is difficult to find diverse demographics.  
While topics of race and ethnic relations have been popular topics for article 
publications in urban politics, the Kinder Houston Area Survey because of its rich data 
capturing individual attitudes concerning a variety of socioeconomic and political topics 
has been used for data-driven learning guides produced by such organizations as the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.  These data-driven 
learning guides are used as references for teaching in the social sciences. In 2009 the 
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research publish a learning guide 
titled, “Age and Attitudes about the Rights of Homosexuals: A Data-Driven Learning 
Guide”, which,  
“…[I]nvestigates trends in attitudes regarding the rights of homosexuals in 
the United States from the early 1990s through 2007. Research questions 
that can be explored using this learning guide include: why younger 
people seem to be more supportive of rights of homosexuals, why the 
general population seems more supportive of some rights of homosexuals 
while being less supportive of other rights, what similarities/dissimilarities 
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might exist between the gay rights movements, the women's movements, 
and the civil rights movements, and the relationship between education 
and support for same-sex marriage (Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, 2009). 
These citations of recent scholarly works have been discussed extensively in this 
chapter to provide a justification for the selection of this data set for the purposes of this 
thesis. The Kinder Houston Area Survey is an excellent data set that is invaluable for its 
measurement of individuals’ attitudes on various socioeconomic and political factors.  
Moving to the specifics of this thesis, The Kinder Houston Area Survey from 
1982-2013 is an excellent data set for studying local partisanship on a large sale. Houston 
is uniquely situated as an excellent case study for the goals of this thesis because of its 
large and diverse population. While large metropolitan areas are hotbeds of liberal 
ideology, Houston (because of its geographical location in the southern United States) is 
also unique in that for a large city it has fairly even partisan split among the population. 
In the sample of the survey alone there were 12,315 (42%) respondents identified as 
Republican and 17,001 (51%) respondents identified as Democrats.2   
To test hypothesis 1, I show residents top three responses by party, percentages, 
and year when asked to name the biggest problem facing people in the Houston area 
today. To show any differences between the parties, I conduct a chi-squared test. 
Respondents had the option to record their answer among nine broad issues that were 
                                                
2 A complete summary of the descriptive statistics of variables included in this study is 
available in Table 1 of the Appendix.  
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selected for the purpose of this study.3 This was one of the only questions included in the 
survey that was asked over all thirty-two years (1982-2013) and acts as a general 
overview for the kinds of local goods and services each party prioritizes over time. The 
results of this table are presented in Table 3 in Appendix C.  
For the remaining hypotheses, I run a logistic regression model for each year the 
various dependent variables were included in the survey. In each model, I include results 
by year to see if there are any important changes in the relationships at different points in 
time. A logistic regression was used because each of the dependent variables had a binary 
response of 0 for no or 1 for yes.4 Model 1 (hypothesis 2) examines the willingness to pay 
school taxes, model 2 (hypothesis 3) looks at the willingness to pay taxes for quality and 
access of healthcare in the Houston area, model 3 (hypothesis) 4 delves into the 
individual determination of the ideal community with views towards the benefits of 
ethnic diversity, and model 4 (hypothesis 5) looks more generally at views towards 
paying taxes for maintaining current levels of local services.  See Table 2 for survey 
question wording details.5  
The primary independent variable of interest is partisanship. I measure this 0 for 
Republicans and 1 for Democrats.6  In each of the models, I include a variable designed 
to tap into the idea of self-interest to test if individual self-interest, separate from 
                                                
3 These issues include traffic, inter-group relations, economy, crime, public health, 
school/children, social issues, taxes/ pollution, and other concerns.  
4 Respondents were asked, “Would you be willing to pay higher taxes if needed to 
improve the quality of public schools?”  
5 Complete survey question wording details are available in Table 2 of the Appendix. 
6 The independent variable is a computed variable which includes partisan leaners with 
more strongly identified partisans. This provides the strongest measure for partisanship in 
the survey. Also, all independents were dropped from the data.    
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partisanship, has an influence on views towards the ideal community arrangement. For 
model 1, this is whether the respondent had children, in model 2 this is whether the 
respondent had health insurance, in model 3 I use ethnicity as the self-interest proxy, and 
model 4 includes satisfaction with living in Houston. In each of the models, I include a 
standard set of control variables: age of respondent, age of respondent squared, gender, 
level of educational attainment, individual income bracket, and ethnicity.  
Given the limitations of interpreting logistic coefficients, for each of the models, I 
present predicted probabilities for the role of partisanship for the most recent year of the 
individual model.7 All of the independent variables were held constant to their means, 
except for partisanship, which varied. Therefore, the results show the predicted difference 
in support between the average Republican and Democrat.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 I only show the most recent year to give an overview of the effects.  In the models, the 
effects size remains similar over time.   
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V. ANALYSIS  
Table 3 shows the results of hypothesis 1, and it is clear Republicans and 
Democrats generally identified similar areas for the biggest problems facing the people of 
Houston. In fact Republicans and Democrats across all thirty-two years consistently 
named the same top three concerns: economy, traffic, and crime. There were only a few 
years where one of these concerns was substituted for the issue areas of: other, social 
issues, school/children, taxes/pollution. While I do not control for self-interest directly, 
these three areas are suggestive that self-interest, at least broadly, is an important 
component that cuts across partisanship. These areas are considered to be directly linked 
to self-interest because of an individuals daily interaction with these factors. However, in 
overall support of the theory, these results are interesting. For every year of the survey I 
also included a chi-squared test in order to show any differences between the parties. In 
the years: 1984-1985, 1989, 1993, 1995, 1997-2013 the results of the chi-squared test 
were significant. Even though both parties were consistently listing the same three 
categories over time they were selecting these at significantly different rates. This shows 
while similar in overall views there are some partisan differences in the level of support 
for most important problems.   
The results in Table 4 support hypothesis 2 as partisanship is significant in both 
years of the model, 1996 and 2006. These results show that Democrats are more willing 
to pay higher taxes to improve the quality of public schools than Republicans. With Table 
24 
 
 
5 showing that 81% of Democrats were willing to pay higher taxes to improve the quality 
of public school while the number was only 67% for Republicans. This is a 15% 
difference between the political parties. Interestingly, there is not a significant difference 
for those that have children compared to those that do not, controlling for party and 
demographics, in either year.  In terms of control variables, in 1996, women were more 
likely to support higher school taxes, while in 2006, age played a significant role in 
willingness to pay higher school taxes. 
Table 6 shows the logistic regression results for differences in partisan 
willingness to pay for improved access to quality healthcare in the Houston area. The 
results also support the third hypothesis. Partisanship was statistically significant in both 
years of the model, 1999 and 2007. These results show that Democrats are more willing 
to pay higher taxes to improve the access to quality healthcare than Republicans. Table 7 
shows that 67% of Democrats were willing to pay higher taxes to improve access to 
quality healthcare while the number was only 37% for Republicans, a 30% difference. 
Once again, the self-interest proxy, whether or not a respondent had health insurance, was 
not significant suggesting partisanship plays a more important role in views towards the 
community than a non-partisan interest.  Additionally, there is not much statistical 
significance among the control variables with the exception of gender in 2007.    
In Table 8, the results for views towards increasing ethnic diversity provide some 
of the more interesting findings for this thesis. The expectation of the hypothesis was that 
Republicans would be less favorable of the increasing ethnic diversity in Houston and 
Democrats would see it more as a strength for the community controlling for the self-
interest of ethnicity. Generally, the results support the hypothesis; however, the role of 
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partisanship varies somewhat across the years.  In each of the nine years, ranging from 
1996 to 2012, the coefficient for party id is always positive suggesting Democrats are 
more likely to support increasing ethnic diversity.  However, the level of statistical 
significance varies.  In 1996 and 1998, there is no statistical difference between 
Democrats and Republicans. From 2000 to 2012, with the exception of 2008, party id is 
either significant (p<.05) or at least marginally significant (p<.10). Overall, these results 
show that Democrats are more open to the increasing ethnic diversity of the Houston area 
than Republicans as Republicans are more likely to answer they view the increasing 
ethnic diversity of the Houston area as a growing problem, whereas, Democrats are more 
likely to answer that they see it as a great strength to the community. However in order to 
get more specific results predicted probabilities were run. Table 9 shows in 2012 80% of 
Democrats were much more open to the idea of increased ethnic diversity than the 65% 
of Republicans, a 15% difference. Self-interest seems to matter here as Hispanics are 
generally supportive of increasing ethnic diversity.  Interestingly, in the years in which 
partisanship is not significant, there is a statistically significant and positive coefficient 
for Hispanics.  In the years with a significant partisan result, the role of ethnicity is mixed 
with no significant relationship between views on diversity and being Hispanic in a few 
years, a significant and positive relationship in others.  In terms of control variables, 
those who are more educated are more likely to support increasing ethnic diversity in 
each of the separate years.   
The results for hypothesis 5 (Table 10) present the most confounding results of 
the thesis. The model was a general inquiry into willingness to pay taxes to maintain 
current levels of public services with the expectation that Democrats would be more 
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willing to pay higher taxes to maintain their current levels of public services than 
Republicans. However, inconsistent with the other results found in the previous models 
about taxation the logistic regression results in Table 10 varies as to which party is more 
inclined to raise taxes in order to maintain current levels of public services.  Republicans 
were statistically more likely to be willing to pay higher taxes in 1996, 2006, and 2008 
while Democrats were statistically more likely to be willing to pay higher taxes in 2004 
and 2010. These results show that depending on the year that either Republicans or 
Democrats are more likely to be willing to pay higher taxes to maintain current levels of 
public services. In order to get more specific results predicted probabilities were run. 
Table 11 shows that in 2010 58% of Democrats and 47% of Republicans are willing to 
pay higher taxes in order to maintain current levels of public services, an 11% difference.  
Similar to hypothesis 2 and 3, there is not much support for the self-interest variable 
while the other controls generally behave as expected although the controls are not very 
robust across years. These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis. This could be for a 
number of reasons: rating Houston as a place to live could not be a very effective control 
for self-interest in this model or that it could be that, consistent with the public choice 
literature, because of the daily use and importance of public services in general that it is 
impossible to separate out self- interest from partisanship in the model.8  
 
 
                                                
8 This does not appear to be related to control of city government either. Houston uses 
partisan elections and had a Democratic mayor in a strong mayor system from 1992-
2011. The results are not consistent with a partisan control explanation as Democrats 
were more supportive of paying taxes for local services under both administrations as 
were Republicans.   
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VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
Overall, the findings of this thesis suggests self-interest is not the primary driving 
force behind an individual’s selection of their ideal community, but rather partisanship 
now plays a crucial role in citizen’s views towards local policies and services. The 
purpose of this thesis was to test whether partisanship plays a role in an individual’s 
selection of their ideal community and whether it would be statistically significant 
controlling for the effects of the traditional explanations of self-interest. People are in 
general self-interested and given the daily use of local goods and services and exposure to 
local conditions, the literature on ideal community selection, public opinion, and public 
choice has commonly regarded self-interest to be the driving force for citizens on these 
topics. The findings here tell a different story about how partisanship acts as an 
information shortcut for how individuals view their services in their communities that 
match their prioritization of local goods, services, and conditions with a partisan bent. 
This thesis brings empirical results forward to connect both popular and academic 
literature on the partisan sort occurring today in the United States.  
The hypotheses for this paper were constructed based on common ideal 
community indicators: biggest problems for the city, willingness to pay school taxes, 
willingness to pay healthcare taxes, feelings towards ethnic diversity, and willingness to 
pay taxes to maintain local goods and services. These hypotheses test the strength of the 
overall theory that Republicans will be less likely than Democrats to be willing to pay 
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higher taxes in general, will prioritize different local conditions, and that Republicans 
will also be less open to ethnic diversity than Democrats. The findings indicate that the 
theory holds strong, meaning that should they be corroborated through further study, and 
suggest partisanship should be a new central variable in the literature concerning ideal 
community selection and view on local government services.  
The findings did not support the theory that Republicans and Democrats would 
select different areas of concern for what they consider to be the biggest problem for the 
Houston area. Both partisans constantly selected the same top three areas: economy, 
traffic, and crime. While this specific hypothesis was not fully supported, consistent with 
the overall theory of the paper, it was found that while both partisans selected the same 
issue areas in over half of the years they placed different values on ranking their 
importance. This shows that both parties prioritize similar issue concerns differently.  
For willingness to pay taxes for public schools, the findings confirm the 
hypothesis that Republicans will be less willing to pay than Democrats. This fits with the 
rhetoric of the national party platforms, as well as with the theory of this thesis that  
partisan differences were expected to occur with regards to taxation. This result while 
finding that partisanship was statistically significant, also found that a relatively high 
number of people in either party are willing to pay higher taxes to improve the quality of 
public schools. A reasonable explanation for this is that this is because a high number of 
people with children that have attended, are attending, or are going to attend public 
schools. Republican respondents accounted for having 12,305 children; while Democrat 
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respondents accounted for having 16,976 children.9 Another explanation could be that the 
higher the quality of public schools in a district the higher the property values tend to be 
which may also relate back to a role for self-interest as well.  
Willingness to pay taxes for healthcare yielded similar results. Confirming the 
hypothesis that Republicans will be less willing to pay than Democrats. I expect that 
unlike taxes to improve a public school, which personally affects a greater number of 
citizens, the largest groups of people affected by sub-standard healthcare are those 
without heath insurance plans such as the low-income and unemployed population; 
although the self-interest proxy did not reach statistical significance in the models. 
Stepping away from local taxation, and looking at local demographic trends, the 
hypothesis that Republicans will be less open to the increasing ethnic diversity in 
Houston than Democrats was supported.  However, similar to willingness to pay for 
school taxes there was a relatively high rate of acceptance of ethnic diversity across 
political parties. This is most likely explained by the respondent’s own ethnic identity 
acting as a self-interest control.  
The most intriguing findings of this thesis comes from the unsupported hypothesis 
that Republicans will be less likely than Democrats to be willing to pay taxes to maintain 
their overall current levels of local services. Given that the expectation was that this 
finding would follow the patterns of the other partisan taxation hypotheses. Here the 
findings are inconsistent with the main theory of this thesis. In 1996, 2006, and 2008 
Republicans were found to be more willing to pay taxes to maintain their current levels of 
local services. And in 2004 and 2010 Democrats were found to be more likely. The back 
                                                
9 These figures were achieved by a simple cross tabulation of the variables for the party 
id of the respondents and for whether or not the respondents had children. 
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and fourth of these findings can not be explained by the theory presented in this thesis. 
Further research beyond the scope of this thesis in the future might be able to identify 
possible explanations.  
 Overall, the findings of this thesis suggests that the driving force behind an 
individual’s selection of their ideal community does not begin and ends with non-
politically related self-interest; rather that it self-interest alone has limited explanatory 
power. I have demonstrated a place for future research on how the partisan make-up of a 
community is an excellent indicator for individuals selecting their ideal communities. 
Partisanship is now more than ever providing individuals with information short cuts to 
find like-minded communities and is an important explanatory factor for how individuals 
view the services their local communities should provide. The findings in this paper 
indicate that the traditional understandings of ideal community selection are at best 
incomplete and that partisanship should be considered a central variable in the future.  
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Table 1: Variable Summary 
      
   
Obs Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  
Year      37301 19.874 8.239 1 32 
Biggest Problem for Houston  34100 3.659 2.203 1 9 10 
 Party ID     29316 0.579 0.493 0 1 
Willingness to Pay School Taxes  1882 0.717       0.450 0 1 
Children      37218 0.714 0.451 0 1 
Willingness to Pay Healthcare Taxes  2561 0.536 0.498 0 1 
Insurance      20759 0.812 0.39 0 1 
Diversity View  
 
11981 0.716       0.450 0 1 
Willingness to Pay for Current Services 13963         .530 0.499 0 1 
Rate Houston as a Place to Live 12935 1.8727 0.763 0 3 
Age of Respondent    35792 43.815 16.658 18 90 
Age Squared  
 
35792 2197.298 1602.718 324 8100 
Gender      37153 0.536 0.498 0 1 11 
Education  
  
37051 1.097 1.037 0 3 
Income      25320 2.866 1.704 0 5 
Race- Black  
  
37001 0.269 0.443 0 1 
Race- Hispanic     37001 0.265 0.441 0 1 
Race- Other  
 
37001 0.073 0.261 0 1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The variable Biggest Problem for Houston came from the survey question: What's the 
biggest problem facing people in the Houston area today? First of all, what would you 
say is the biggest problem facing people in the Houston area today?  It allowed for open-
ended responses that were: coded into nine categories: 1-Traffic 2-Intergroup relations 3-
Economy 4-Crime 5-Public health 6-Schools/Children 7-Social issues 8-Taxes/Pollution 
9-Other Concerns. 
11 The variable Gender is coded: 0- Male 1-Female  
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Table 2: Survey Question Wording  
	   	  
  	   	  Year: This is a recording of when the survey was conducted each year in Febuary  
	   	    and/or March from (1) 1982- (32) 2013  
	   	  Age:  How old were you on your last birthday? 
	   	    Response Categories: 18-90 and above  
	   	  Gender:  This is a recording of the gender of the survey respondent. 
	   	    Response Categories: Male or Female  
	   	  Ethnic Group:  Are you Anglo, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or some other ethnic background?  
	   	    Response Categories: Anglo, Black, Hispanic, Asian, Other, Mixed   
	   	  Education:  What is the highest grade of school or year of college that you’ve completed? 
	   	    Response Categories: 9 th grade or less; 10 th or 11 th grade;  
	   	    12 th High School Diploma; 1 year College; 
	   	    2 or 3 years College or A.A. Degree; 4 years College or B.A. Degree;  
	   	    Some post-grad; M.A. or M.S. Degree; Professional; PhD, JD, MD 
	   	  Income Bracket:  What income category includes your total household income (in past year)?  
	   	    Response Categories: Less than $15,000; $15,001-$25,000; $25,001-$35,000; 
	   	     $35,001-$50,000; $50,001-$75,000; More than 75,000 
	   	  Party ID:  This is a computed variable, combining PARTY and LEANING into  
	   	    two categories: Declared Computed variable, combining the variables PARTY 
	   	     and LEANING into two categories: Declared or closer to the 
	   	     Republican Party or to the Democratic Party 
	   	    PARTY: Would you call yourself a Republican, a Democrat,  
	   	     an Independent, or something else? 
	   	    LEANING: If R does not name either major party (PARTY):  
	   	    Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or 
	   	    to the Democratic Party? 
	   	    Response Categories: Republican or Democrat 
	   	  Big Prob. 
Houston:  
First of all, what would you say is the biggest problem facing people in the 
Houston area today?  
	   	    Response Categories: Traffic; Inter-group relations; Economy;  
	   	    Crime; Public health; Schools/Children;  
	   	    Social issues; Taxes/Pollution; Other Concerns 
	   	  School Taxes:  What about public education? Would you personally be willing  
	   	  
  
 to pay higher taxes if that were needed to improve the quality of the public 
schools, or would you be opposed to increasing taxes for that purpose?   
	   	    Response Categories: No (Opposed to an increase) or  
	   	    Yes (Willing to pay higher taxes)  
	   	   
 
 
Children:  
 
 
 
Do you have any children? [If “yes”:] How many children do you have? 
	   	  
  
Response Categories: No (Opposed to an increase) or Yes (Willing to pay higher 
taxes) 
	   	  Healthcare 
Taxes:  Would you be willing to pay higher taxes to improve access to  
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  quality health care in the Houston area,  
	   	    or would you be opposed to increasing taxes for that purpose?  
	   	  
  
Response Categories: No (Opposed to an increase) or Yes (Willing to pay higher 
taxes) 
	   	  Insurance:  Do you and your family currently have any health insurance? 
	   	  
  
Response Categories: No (Opposed to an increase) or Yes (Willing to pay higher 
taxes) 
	   	  Diversity View:  Do you think that the increasing ethnic diversity in Houston will eventually   
	   	    become a source of great strength for the city; or: a growing problem for the city? 
	   	    Response Categories: Great Strength or Growing Problem  
	   	  Local Taxes:  In today’s economy, local government may be faced with the choice of  
	   	    either increasing taxes or reducing services.  
	   	     Would you personally be willing to pay higher taxes in order to maintain  
	   	  
  
the current levels of public services, or would you prefer to reduce the level of 
services in order to avoid a tax increase? (If that were the only choice, which 
would you prefer: raise taxes or reduce services?)   
	   	  Rating 
Houston:  Response Categories: Reduce Services or Raise Taxes  
	   	  
 
How would you rate the Houston area in general as a place to live? Would you 
say: excellent, good, fair, or poor? 
	   	    Response Categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, Poor 
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Table 3: Respondents Rate the Biggest Problem for the Houston Area. 
 
Biggest Problem  Second Biggest Problem  Third Biggest Problem  
1984 
   Republican  Traffic 50%  Economy 17% Crime 13%   
Democrat  Traffic 40% Economy 30% Crime 16% 
chi2(6)= 15.32 
   1985 
   Republican  Traffic 45% Economy 21% Crime 15% 
Democrat  Economy 34% Traffic 30% Crime 11% 
chi2(6)= 23.20 
   1986 
   Republican  Economy 36% Traffic 34% Crime 17% 
Democrat  Economy 39% Traffic 29% Crime 21% 
chi2(6)= 6.53 
   1987 
   Republican  Economy 72% Traffic 11% Other 6% 
Democrat  Economy 74% Other 8% Crime 7% 
chi2(6)= 7.14 
   1988 
   Republican  Economy 63% Traffic 14% Crime 10% 
Democrat  Economy 64% Crime 15% Traffic 10% 
chi2(6)= 9.22 
   1989 
   Republican  Economy 41% Crime 22% Traffic/ Social Issues 12% 
Democrat  Economy 47% Social Issues 18% Crime 17% 
chi2(7)= 19.96 
   1990 
   Republican  Crime 57% Economy 18% Traffic 11% 
Democrat  Crime 53% Economy 22% Traffic 11% 
chi2(7)= 5.85 
   1991 
   Republican  Crime 38% Economy 23% Traffic 11% 
Democrat  Crime 44% Economy 28% Traffic 11% 
chi2(8)= 9.10 
   1992 
   Republican  Crime 69% Economy 20% Other 4% 
Democrat  Crime 66% Economy 23% Other 4% 
chi2(7)= 12.03 
   1993 
   Republican  Crime 55% Economy 27% School/Children 5% 
Democrat  Crime 46% Economy 38% Traffic 5% 
chi2(8)= 19.70 
   1994 
   Republican  Crime 78% Economy 8% Traffic 4% 
Democrat  Crime 71% Economy 17% Traffic 3% 
chi2(8)= 16.52 
   1995 
   Republican  Crime 63% Economy 14% Traffic 7% 
Democrat  Crime 58% Economy 23% Traffic 6% 
chi2(8)= 26.22 
   1996 
   Republican  Crime 62% Economy 10% Traffic 10% 
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Democrat  Crime 64% Economy 14% Traffic 9% 
chi2(8)= 5.66 
   1997 
   Republican  Crime 46% Traffic 15% Economy 10% 
Democrat  Crime 50% Economy 22% Other/Schools/Children 6% 
chi2(8)= 64.55  
   1998 
   Republican  Crime 38% Traffic 27% Economy 8% 
Democrat  Crime 48% Economy 16% Traffic 15% 
chi2(8)= 49.29 
   1999 
   Republican  Crime 37% Traffic 28% Economy 10% 
Democrat  Crime 43% Traffic 20% Economy 18% 
chi2(8)= 38.06 
   2000 
   Republican  Traffic 39% Crime 25% Taxes/ Pollution 12% 
Democrat  Crime 36% Traffic 22% Economy 13% 
chi2(8)= 49.50 
   2001 
   Republican  Traffic 40% Crime 23% Taxes/ Pollution 12% 
Democrat  Crime 29% Traffic 27% Economy 14% 
chi2(8)= 31.77 
   2002 
   Republican  Traffic 45% Economy 16% Crime 12% 
Democrat  Traffic 34% Economy 22% Crime 17%  
chi2(8)= 29.01 
   2003 
   Republican  Traffic 38% Economy 22% Taxes/ Pollution 15% 
Democrat  Economy 38% Traffic 29% Crime 12% 
chi2(8)= 65.56 
   2004 
   Republican  Traffic 55% Economy 19% Crime 10% 
Democrat  Traffic 43% Economy 26% Crime 14% 
chi2(8)= 29.54 
   2005 
   Republican  Traffic 46% Crime 14% Taxes/ Pollution 13% 
Democrat  Traffic 35% Economy 24% Crime 16% 
chi2(8)= 33.82 
   2006 
   Republican  Traffic 31% Crime 30% Other 11% 
Democrat  Crime 37% Traffic/ Economy 19% Other 13% 
chi2(8)= 57.72 
   2007 
   Republican  Crime 35% Traffic 30% Taxes/Pollution 11% 
Democrat  Crime 35% Traffic 23% Economy 16% 
chi2(8)= 61.04 
   2008 
   Republican  Traffic 36% Crime 24% Economy 11% 
Democrat  Crime 27% Traffic 26% Economy 23% 
chi2(8)= 62.53 
   2009 
   Republican  Economy 43% Traffic 23% Crime 18% 
Democrat  Economy 50% Crime 21% Traffic 18% 
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chi2(8)= 24.21 
   2010 
   Republican  Economy 34% Traffic 30% Crime 18% 
Democrat  Economy 40% Traffic 26% Crime 22% 
chi2(8)= 29.05 
   2011 
   Republican  Economy 38% Traffic 21% Crime 19% 
Democrat  Economy 47% Traffic 19% Crime 18% 
chi2(8)= 32.85 
   2012 
   Republican  Economy 40% Traffic 17% Crime 15% 
Democrat  Economy 50% Traffic 16% Crime 15% 
chi2(8)= 34.12 
   2013 
   Republican  Economy 28% Traffic 23% Crime 22% 
Democrat  Economy 31% Traffic 27% Crime 22% 
chi2(8)= 16.64 
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APPENDIX D: LOGISTIC MODEL OF SURVEY RESPONDENT POLARIZATION 
ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SCHOOL TAXES 
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 Table 4: Willingness to Pay Taxes for Public Schools by Partisanship 
Logistic Model of Survey Respondent Polarization  
  Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
 
  
Respondent Polarization	   
 1996 School Taxes  2006 School Taxes  
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.814 0.002 Party ID 0.811 0.003 
Children  0.069    0.800 Children           0.220 0.464 
Age of R -0.015 0.714 Age of R -0.162 0.000 
Age Sq -0.000 0.856 Age Sq 0.001 0.001 
Gender  0.488 0.028 Gender  0.344 0.156 
Education  0.143 0.237 Education  -0.096 0.435 
Income  -0.042 0.607 Income  -0.021 0.804 
Black  -0.201 0.584 Black  -0.407 0.261 
Hispanic  0.187    0.640 Hispanic  -0.052 0.880 
Race- Other  -0.056 0.928 Race- Other  -0.657 0.248 
N 447 
 
N 443 
 Pseudo R2 0.0593 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0735 
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APPENDIX E: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF RESPONDENT POLARIZATION 
ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR SCHOOL TAXES 
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Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Pay Taxes for Public Schools by 
Partisanship 
Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization on School Taxes  
 Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
 School Taxes  
 	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Republican  
 
                   67% 
	   	   	  Democrat  	  	   81% 
	   	   	   
Contrasts of Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization on School Taxes  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
	  School Taxes  
 	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Party ID 
 	   	   	   	  Republican vs. Democrat 15% 
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APPENDIX F: LOGISTIC MODEL OF SURVEY RESPONDENT POLARIZATION 
ON WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTH CARE TAXES 
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   Table 6: Willingness to Pay Taxes for Access to Healthcare by Partisanship 
Logistic Model of Survey Respondent Polarization  
  Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
 
  
Respondent Polarization	  	    
1999 Healthcare Taxes  2007 Healthcare Taxes  
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.865 0.000 Party ID 1.298 0.000 
Insurance   -0.125 0.546 Insurance   -0.273 0.563 
Age of R -0.020 0.409 Age of R 0.013 0.776 
Age Sq 0.000 0.510 Age Sq -0.000 0.534 
Gender  0.031 0.824 Gender  0.685 0.007 
Education  -0.132 0.096 Education  0.109 0.419 
Income  0.013 0.801 Income  -0.128 0.183 
Black  0.326 0.105 Black  -0.328 0.362 
Hispanic  0.073 0.716 Hispanic  -0.007 0.982 
Race- Other  0.597 0.078 Race- Other  -0.61 0.436 
N 936 
 
N 313 
 Pseudo R2 0.0524 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1122 
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APPENDIX G: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF RESPONDENT POLARIZATION ON 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR HEALTHCARE TAXES  
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Table 7: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Pay Taxes for Healthcare by  
Partisanship 
Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Healthcare Taxes  
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Republican  
 
                   37% 
	   	  Democrat  	  	   67% 
	   	   
Contrasts of Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Healthcare Taxes  
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Party ID 
 	   	   	  Republican vs. Democrat 30% 
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APPENDIX H: LOGISTIC MODEL OF SURVEY RESPONDENT POLARIZATION ON 
FEELINGS TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY   
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Table 8: Residents Feelings Towards Increasing Ethnic Diversity in Houston 
 
Logistic Model of Survey Respondent Polarization  
 Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
  
Respondent Polarization	   
1996 Ethnic Diversity   1998 Ethnic Diversity   
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.133 0.585 Party ID 0.0021 0.991 
Age of R 0.103 0.007 Age of R -0.019 0.468 
Age Sq -0.001 0.006 Age Sq -8.02 0.977 
Gender  -0.037 0.863 Gender  -0.04 0.794 
Education  0.289 0.016 Education  0.295 0.001 
Income  -0.043 0.594 Income  0.064 0.256 
Black  0.052 0.873 Black  -0.143 0.507 
Hispanic  0.931 0.014 Hispanic  0.453 0.053 
Race- 
Other  -0.521 0.358 
Race- 
Other  -0.035 0.932 
N 421 
 
N 816 
 Pseudo R2 0.0443 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0536 
       2000 Ethnic Diversity   2002 Ethnic Diversity   
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.328 0.075 Party ID 0.396 0.010 
Age of R 0.028 0.275 Age of R 0.019 0.348 
Age Sq 0.000 0.067 Age Sq 0.000 0.078 
Gender  -0.048 0.763 Gender  -0.068 0.603 
Education  0.329 0.001 Education  0.198 0.008 
Income  0.075 0.201 Income  0.129 0.006 
Black  0.095 0.672 Black  -0.308 0.124 
Hispanic  0.235 0.321 Hispanic  -0.124 0.563 
Race- 
Other  0.057 0.894 
Race- 
Other  0.038 0.853 
N 799 
 
N 1251 
 Pseudo R2 0.0451 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0443 
       2004 Ethnic Diversity   2006 Ethnic Diversity   
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.658 0.003 Party ID 0.334 0.074 
Age of R -0.001 0.958 Age of R -0.033 0.185 
Age Sq -0.000 0.72 Age Sq 0.000 0.404 
Gender  0.091 0.639 Gender  -0.14 0.374 
Education  0.251 0.028 Education  0.457 0.000 
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Income  0.092 0.183 Income  0.012 0.817 
Black  -0.457 0.088 Black  0.045 0.838 
Hispanic  -0.009 0.973 Hispanic  0.579 0.009 
Race- 
Other  -0.53 0.375 
Race- 
Other  0.129 0.817 
N 629 
 
N 843 
 Pseudo R2 0.0363 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0497 
       2008 Ethnic Diversity   2010 Ethnic Diversity   
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID 0.009 0.966 Party ID 0.381 0.095 
Age of R -0.027 0.41 Age of R -0.032 0.309 
Age Sq 0.000 0.571 Age Sq 0.000 0.471 
Gender  -0.116 0.553 Gender  -0.07 0.708 
Education  0.489 0.000 Education  0.381 0.000 
Income  0.033 0.636 Income  0.094 0.118 
Black  0.761 0.006 Black  0.019 0.942 
Hispanic  0.686 0.012 Hispanic  0.381 0.141 
Race- 
Other  0.375 0.445 
Race- 
Other  0.208 0.753 
N 684 
 
N 819 
 Pseudo R2 0.0516 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0414 
       2012 Ethnic Diversity   
   
 
Coef.  P 
   Party ID 0.755 0.000 
   Age of R -0.02 0.388 
   Age Sq 0.000 0.716 
   Gender  -0.258 0.077 
   Education  0.359 0.000 
   Income  0.028 0.565 
   Black  -0.079 0.675 
   Hispanic  0.627 0.003 
   Race- 
Other  0.449 0.307 
   N 1099 
    Pseudo R2 0.0561 
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APPENDIX I: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF RESPONDENT POLARIZATION ON 
FEELINGS TOWARDS ETHNIC DIVERSITY  
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Table 9: Predicted Probabilities of Feelings Towards Ethnic Diversity by Partisanship 
Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Ethnic Diversity   
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Republican  
 
                   65% 
	   	  Democrat  	  	   80% 
	   	   
Contrasts of Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Ethnic Diversity   
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Party ID 
 	   	   	  Republican vs. Democrat 14% 
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APPENDIX J: LOGISTIC MODEL OF SURVEY RESPONDENT POLARIZATION ON 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LOCAL SERVICES   
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Table 10: Willingness to Pay for Local Services  
Logistic Model of Survey Respondent Polarization  
	  Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
	    
Respondent Polarization	  	  
1996 Local Services    2004 Local Services  
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID -0.664 0.004 Party ID 0.753 0.000 
Houston  -0.029 0.840 Houston  0.126 0.278 
Age of R -0.025 0.497 Age of R -0.057 0.072 
Age Sq 0.000 0.423 Age Sq 0.000 0.103 
Gender  -0.478 0.018 Gender  0.587 0.001 
Education  0.038 0.729 Education  0.250 0.016 
Income  -0.058 0.440 Income  0.069 0.280 
Black  -0.254 0.429 Black  -0.195 0.426 
Hispanic  0.373 0.263 Hispanic  -0.338 0.170 
Race- 
Other  -1.307 0.057 
Race- 
Other  -0.97 0.072 
N 434 
 
N 616 
 Pseudo R2 0.0461 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0551 
       2006 Local Services   2008 Local Services   
 
Coef.  P 
 
Coef.  P 
Party ID -1.134 0.000 Party ID -1.083 0.000 
Houston  -0.213 0.025 Houston  -0.092 0.414 
Age of R 0.004 0.838 Age of R 0.005 0.861 
Age Sq -0.000 0.773 Age Sq -0.000 0.853 
Gender  0.168 0.250 Gender  -0.304 0.063 
Education  -0.116 0.149 Education  -0.148 0.084 
Income  -0.118 0.020 Income  0.021 0.717 
Black  0.484 0.023 Black  0.591 0.011 
Hispanic  0.386 0.057 Hispanic  0.158 0.484 
Race- 
Other  0.296 0.534 
Race- 
Other  0.355 0.373 
N 864 
 
N 669 
 Pseudo R2 0.0503 
 
Pseudo R2 0.0449 
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2010 Local Services  
 
Coef.  P 
   Party ID 0.457 0.011 
   Houston  -0.011 0.912 
   Age of R -0.000 0.990 
   Age Sq 0.000 0.758 
	   	   	  Gender  0.102 0.490 
	   	   	  Education  0.190 0.019 
	   	   	  Income  0.077 0.119 
	   	   	  Black  -0.120 0.577 
	   	   	  Hispanic  0.108 0.592 
	   	   	  Race- 
Other  0.672 0.185 
	   	   	  N 801 
 	   	   	  Pseudo R2 0.0218 
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APPENDIX K: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF RESPONDENT POLARIZATION ON 
WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR LOCAL SERVICES  
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Table 11: Predicted Probabilities of Willingness to Pay for Local Services by Partisanship 
Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Local Services    
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Republican  
 
                   47% 
	   	  Democrat  	  	   58% 
	   	   
Contrasts of Predicted Probabilities of Respondent Polarization  
Based on Data from the Kinder Houston Area Survey 1982-2013 
Local Services    
 	   	  
	   	   	   	   	  Party ID 
 	   	   	  Republican vs. Democrat 11% 
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